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When a local government grants a landowner permission to de-
velop, two things ordinarily occur. First, the landowner's property in-
creases in value because development permission allows market de-
mand to come into play. Second, development usually creates a need
for additional public works and services.
"Impact taxes" have evolved in some states primarily to cope with
the public facilities and services costs caused by new development.
Subdivision exactions, which normally take the form of required dedi-
cation or reservation of land for public improvements and facilities, the
provision of these improvements and facilities and the payment of fees
in lieu of dedication, reservation or provision, have traditionally been
the means for imposing the cost of new development on the develop-
ment itself. There are statutory limits, however, on the types of facili-
ties and services that subdivision exactions can provide. Some states
might not allow a local government to exact land for parks; other states
might allow park exactions, but not allow exactions for fire station sites
or school sites. Exactions could never be used to finance operating
as distinguished from capital costs.
Communities that wanted to allocate more costs to new develop-
ment than subdivision exaction law allowed circumvented these limits
* This article is an edited version of a chapter from a book, tentatively titled
Windfalls for Wipeouts, to be published by the American Society of Planning Officials,
Chicago, Illinois, in 1977, and is printed with the permission of the Society. The book
is the work product of a research project directed by Donald G. Hagman, Professor of
Law, University of California, Los Angeles, that deals with means of recapturing in-
creases in land values and techniques for mitigating decreases in land values. The proj-
ect was financed by the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Policy Development and
Research, U.S. Dep't of Housing and Urban Development, as a Comprehensive Planning
Research and Demonstration Project under 40 U.S.C. § 461(b) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
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neither necessarily agrees nor disagrees.
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in two ways. First, they ignored the limits. Developers either ac-
cepted illegal exactions or risked the obstacles a local government could
create throughout the development process. Second, additional exac-
tions being illegal but not necessarily immoral, local governments sought
to invent a new tool to raise additional revenues for capital improve-
ments and municipal services.
We call this new tool an impact tax, although it is also known
as a bedroom or new construction tax. In most cases, the tax takes
the form of a fixed levy imposed on a given unit-e.g., $100 per bed-
room or $.05 per square foot. Local governments frequently collect
the entire tax before construction begins; often the tax will be payable
when final subdivision maps are approved or when a building permit
is issued.
Impact taxes are innovative because they commonly fund the
types of facilities and services needed by new development that could
not be funded by way of subdivision exactions. Impact taxes can fund
municipal services such as fire protection and libraries, capital improve-
ments such as the expansion of sewage treatment facilities, or operating
costs of capital improvements. In California, impact taxes can even
be treated as general revenue; local governments need not spend the
taxes to benefit the development from which the taxes were collected.,
I1. IMPACT TAXES AS A WINDFALL RECAPTURE DEViCE
A. Introduction
There are two types of windfalls associated with development. 2
First, by allowing market forces to act fully on a given parcel of land,
governmental development permission can trigger an unearned in-
crease in land value. We label this increase "Windfall I." New de-
velopment also necessitates the installation of infrastructure and the
provision of municipal services; if the community at large finances these
development generated costs, the development enjoys a windfall that
we label "Windfall HI."
Unearned increases in land value (Windfall I) are generally not
recaptured by impact taxes. Historically, Windfall I gains have not
been recaptured by any device in the United States. Additionally,
1. See text accompanying notes 34-38 infra.
2. See generally AMn.RCAN SOCIETY OF PLANNING OFFICIALS, WINDFALLS FOR
WipEouTs ch. 15 (D. Hagman ed. 1977) (tentative title) [hereinafter cited as Hagman].
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since impact taxes grew out of subdivision exactions, they tend to be
used more to recapture public facilities and services-costs (Windfall II).
How well do impact taxes recapture Windfall I gains? The an-
swer depends on how the impact tax is calculated. Two methods of
calculating impact taxes are currently used in the United States.
B. Revenue-Raising Impact Taxes
Impact taxes designed to raise general revenues may or may not
recapture Windfall II gain. The answer depends on the local govern-
ment's budgetary position when the impact tax rate is calculated. For
example, a revenue-raising impact tax may recapture less than the
whole Windfall I gain. Suppose a city collects an abundance of tax
dollars from several manufacturing plants in its taxing jurisdiction.
The city then decides to encourage residential development. The city
is willing to provide a partial "subsidy" to residential development
by using general revenues to finance the water and sewer needs of
the residential development. The city also imposes an impact tax
of fifty dollars per bedroom. The proceeds from the impact tax will
go into the general fund and help defray the cost of acquiring parks
for all the new residents. Here the impact tax raises general revenues,
but it offsets only a portion of the public costs generated by the new
development.
Revenue-raising impact taxes can also recapture the exact amount
of the Windfall II gain. In the example above, the city's impact tax
could have been calculated on the basis of the total needs of new de-
velopment, including water, sewage, and parks. This approach would
probably substantially increase the rate.
A third possibility is that revenue-raising impact taxes can collect
more than the Windfall II gain enjoyed by a given development. Sup-
pose the city in our example does not enjoy an abundance of t f rev-
enue but is instead hard-pressed. If the city is an attractive site for
development, it might be able to impose high impact taxes without dis-
couraging new development. The tax for a given development could
be set well above the public costs generated by that development, yet
low enough to leave the developer an acceptable profit. The city
thereby obtains enough revenue to meet its budgetary obligations and
the developer is left with enough profit to stay in business.
The last situation, where impact taxes exceed the public costs gen-
erated by new development, gives rise to an equal'protection problem.
1977] 409
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Assuming that a developer passes the cost of the impact tax to the pur-
chasers of his product,' is it fair that these new residents finance pro-
jects that benefit the community at large? In states where the issue
has arisen, the answer has been "no"; new residents can only be re-
quired to foot the bill for the costs that they create, and community
costs must be financed by a tax levied uniformly throughout the com-
munity.4 California is the sole exception to this rule. In California,
impact taxes can basically be set as high as the market will bear, and
can finance facilities that benefit the whole community.8
C. Impact Taxes Keyed to Public Costs
An impact tax directly connected with the cost of all public facili-
ties and services that a local government provides to a new development
is a pure Windfall II recapture device.
In states (other than California) that allow impact taxes, the taxes
are so connected with development-generated costs. In most states,
however, impact taxes are currently used to offset only a portion of
these costs. Nevada, for example, only permits local governments to
impose impact taxes for park acquisition.6
If an impact tax is limited to offsetting the cost of parks, or, as
is commonly the case, to sewer costs, then the impact tax works as an
imperfect Windfall II recapture device. In this situation, the commu-
nity is subsidizing development-generated costs other than parks or
sewage, and a Windfall II gain would still exist. One state, Virginia,
has recognized this problem; Virginia's impact tax is based on a concept
of "net public cost," a concept that is broad enough to include most
development-generated costs.
7
An impact tax keyed to development-generated costs will, of
course, vary inversely with any applicable development permission ex-
actions. For example, if a developer must install street lighting (or
pay a fee in lieu thereof) as a condition for obtaining subdivision ap-
proval, then no impact tax will be imposed for that purpose.
D. Impact Taxes Versus Development Permission Exactions
Impact taxes and development permission exactions8 usually serve
3. See id., ch. 7, for a discussion of this assumption.
4. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 16-19 infra.
5. See text accompanying notes 40-44 infra.
6. See text accompanying note 30 infra.
7. See text accompanying notes 32-33 infra.
8. See generally Hagman, supra note 2, ch. 15.
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the same purpose; both attempt to allocate the public costs of new de-
velopment to the development itself. Impact taxes, however, have
several characteristics that better suit them for this purpose.
First, impact taxes provide an immediate source of revenue to
help ease the burden of new residents on existing community facilities
and services. Second, the need to extend services to new residents begins
when they arrive. There may be a time lag before the new tax base
provided by new residents can be utilized. The immediate revenue
source provided by impact taxes resolves this problem. Third, impact
taxes may well provide more certainty to a developer. The exaction
system has grown up under a practice involving a highly elastic ruler;
the process is often quite informal and open to negotiation. Some de-
velopers may consider this flexibility as tantamount to extortion. An
advantage of impact taxation is that fees may be more readily deter-
mined before the decision to develop. Consequently, developers are
in a better position to calculate the cost of development. Fourth, im-
pact taxes are easily administered if they take the form of a flat rate
per given unit. Finally, there may even be advantages for the devel-
oper if the impact tax is assessed late in the development process-
e.g., when a building permit is approved. At such a late stage, the
fees need not be financed and carried over a long period of time. The
impact tax, as opposed to exactions, is paid at a time much closer to
the cash flow that begins when the units are sold.
II. UNSUCCESSFUL IMPACT TAxEs
A. Lack of Statutory Authority
1. Michigan
The City of St. Clair Shores, a suburb of Detroit, had a population
of 19,000 in 1950. By 1959, its population had almost tripled to be-
tween 50,000 and 60,000 people. The city sought to charge a substan-
tial part of the associated increased expenses of city government to
these new residents in the form of increased building permit fees.
The Michigan Supreme Court held that increased expenses of city
government arising from the growth of a city
are the public problems of the community and the expenses in-
curred in their solution are to be defrayed (absent valid legislation
otherwise providing) from the general revenues of the city, not
1977]
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on a fee basis under the guise of regulating such matters as plumb-
ing and wiring in the new houses."
Evidence established that the revenue derived from the increased
building permit fee was entirely disproportionate to the cost of issuing
such a permit and the direct and indirect costs of administration.
Although the court lauded the purpose for which the revenues were
collected, it held that a regulation designed to raise revenue was in-
valid; in effect, the city had impermissibly sought to raise revenues un-
der its regulatory powers.
This result is similar to early California decisions. There was no
discussion in the St. Clair case, however, of the legality of basing impact
taxes on a city's power to tax, a ground California courts used to uphold
impact taxes.
2. New Jersey
On February 17, 1956, the Borough of Point Pleasant increased
the fees charged for the issuance of building permits to five cents per
square foot for business and manufacturing construction, to ten cents
per square foot for additions to existing dwellings, and to twenty-five
cents per square foot with a two hundred dollar minimum charge for
new dwellings.
A building contractor whose fees increased from an average of
$18 to $262 brought suit and established that, although the building
fees had increased dramatically, the cost of regulating new construction
had increased very little if at all. 10 The Supreme Court of New Jersey
held the impact tax invalid as an ordinance enacted under authority of
the police power. The court indicated that the state legislature could
authorize revenue-raising impact taxes. On the facts before it, how-
ever, the court did not find such an authorization."1
3. Arizona
In September, 1971, the City of Tempe, Arizona enacted a "Parks
and Recreation Facility Tax" ordinance whereby a fee of $50 on each
new apartment unit and $100 on each new housing unit was required.
The Arizona Supreme Court held this ordinance unconstitutional.1 2
9. Merrelli v. City of St. Clair Shores, 355 Mich. 575, 586, 96 N.W.2d 144, 149
(1959).
10. Daniels v. Borough of Point Pleasant, 23 N.J. 357, 129 A.2d 265 (1957).
11. Id. at 362, 129 A.2d at 267.
12. Homebuilders Ass'n v. Riddel, 109 Ariz. 404, 510 P.2d 376 (1973).
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The court found that "the power of taxation is to be exercised by the
State Legislature and not by municipalities, unless the power is con-
ferred specifically by charter or delegated by statute.' 3  Tempe had
no charter provision permitting such a fee, and the constitutional pro-
vision on which the City relied did not confer this power.
The court next rejected the argument that the impact tax was valid
as a special assessment. 14  Tempe's impact tax could be spent any-
where in the city, whereas a special assessment had to be "used for
neighborhood park land at a location so as to specially enhance the
value of the taxpayers' property as opposed to benefits diffused through-
out the City."' 5
4. Maryland
State Senate Bill SB731, introduced in Maryland in February,
1973, would have required that all charter counties charge a fee when
issuing a building permit. That fee would include an amount equal
to the capital costs needed to provide the additional county services.
The bill was not enacted.
B. Discrimination Against New Residents: Utah
Perhaps even the legislature could not authorize impact taxes in
Utah. A state statute authorizes cities to raise revenues by imposing
business license taxes, but the taxes must be "uniform in respect to the
class upon which they are imposed.' 6 The Utah Supreme Court found
this uniformity requirement violated by an impact tax in the form of a
$100 building permit fee.' 7 The court believed that the impact tax
placed "a disproportionate and unfair burden [of the cost of city govern-
ment] on the class of new households."'" Uniformity was held to be
required by constitutional guarantees of equal protection as well as
by Utah statute. 9
13. Id. at 406, 510 P.2d at 378 (emphasis added).
14. For a detailed discussion of special assessments, see Hagman, supra note 2, ch.
13.
15. 109 Ariz. at 407, 510 P.2d at 379.
16. UTAH CODE ANN. § 10-8-80 (1953).
17. Weber Basin Home Builders Ass'n v. Roy City, 26 Utah 2d 215, 487 P.2d 866
(1971).
18. Id. at 219, 487 P.2d at 869.
19. Id.
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IV. IMPACT TAXES OFFSETTING
DEVELOPMENT-GENERATED COSTS
A. Municipal Service Expansion: Florida
The controversy over impact taxes has been hottest in Florida. In
the first reported decision, a Florida trial court struck down an impact
tax funding the acquisition and development of parks and open space
for the benefit of the general public. 20  The court found that the tax
lacked statutory authority and subjected new residents to double taxa-
tion because of a property tax also assessed.
Lack of statutory authority was the ground used by a Florida ap-
pellate court to invalidate a different impact tax.21 The court con-
cluded that the fee did not have to be spent to benefit the development
from which it was collected. 22  The absence of a direct connection be-
tween the area of collection and the area of expenditure made the fee
a "tax." The tax was invalid because there was no state statute "per-
mitting such fees for impact to create funds for heightened county
costs.1
2 3
An impact tax for the privilege of connecting to a city's water and
sewage systems has been upheld in Florida. In City of Dunedin v.
Contractors & Builders Association,24 the court treated a $325 water
connection fee and a $375 sewage connection fee as a user charge, not
a tax. Unlike the taxes imposed in the two other cases, user charges
were authorized by state statute and city charter.2
Under the court's holding,
a municipality may properly charge for the privilege of connecting
to the system a fee which is in excess of the physical cost of con-
nection, if this fee does not exceed a proportionate part of the
amount reasonably necessary to finance the [system] expansion
and is earmarked for that purpose. 2
0
Thus, Florida has limited impact taxes to offsetting the cost of
municipal service expansion. Further, new development may only be
20. Venditti-Sivaro, Inc. v. City of Hollywood, 39 Fla. Supp. 121 (Cir. Ct. 1973).
21. Broward County v. Janis Dev. Corp., 311 So. 2d 371 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1975).
22. Id. at 375.
23. Id. at 376.
24. 312 So. 2d 763 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).




taxed for the proportionate share of service expansion cost that is "spe-
cially and uniquely attributable"27 to the new development.
B. Park and Recreation Costs: Nevada
On April 30, 1973, the Nevada State Legislature approved legis-
lation that provided for exactions and fees in lieu thereof.28 In ad-
dition to these subdivision exactions, the city council of any city or the
board of county commissioners of any county having adopted a master
plan may impose a "residential construction tax."2 The purpose of the
tax is to raise revenue only for "the acquisition, improvement, and ex-
pansion of public park, playground, and recreational facilities in the city
or county. Moneys in the fund shall be expended, insofar as it is prac-
tical and feasible to do so, for the benefit of the immediate area from
which it was collected.
'80
The statute also specifies that the requirements for dedication of
land and the imposition of the residential construction tax are mutually
exclusive: if parks are dedicated by the developer, no impact taxes can
be assessed.3'
C. "Net Public Costs": Virginia
Loudoun County, Virginia is the site of a hybrid form of impact
taxation. Located just outside the Washington, D.C. metropolitan
area, Loudoun County has long been ripe for development. Levitt,
one of the nation's largest homebuilders, wanted to build a $112 mil-
lion, 13,000 resident planned community there. However, in early
1971 the Loudoun County Board of Supervisors denied Levitt's rezon-
ing application. The board's rationale was basically that the develop-
ment would cost the county more in increased service demands than
it would provide in new revenue. Levitt challenged the county's denial
of its rezoning application. To Levitt's dismay, however, the circuit
court upheld the board's denial of the rezoning application, stating that
"facilities essential to the public health, safety, and general welfare are
27. See Rhodes, Impact Fees: The Cost-Benefit Dilemma in Florida, 27 LAND USE
L. & ZONING DIG., No. 10, 1975, at 7.
28. NEv. REv. STAT. § 278.4979 (1975). See generally Hagman, supra note 2, ch.
15.
29. Id. § 278.4983(1).
30. Id. § 278.4983(5).
31. Id. § 278.4987.
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not cost-free and a governing body may consider the economic effect
of providing such incidentals to a proposed rezoning ....
In June, 1972, a new zoning ordinance was passed by the county
board of supervisors. Article 12 of that ordinance has been the subject
of controversy since its inception. In general, article 12 provides for
the method by which amendments to the county zoning ordinance may
be pursued. The prospective developer may follow one or two options
as a precondition to rezoning. One option for the developer is to show
that his proposed development requires no enlargement or extension
of any public facility that would involve a "net public cost" to the
county. A "net public cost" is defined as the difference in capital costs
between the capital outlay attributable to the proposed development
and the public cost that would have occurred were the property devel-
oped under existing zoning. The second option open to the developer
recognizes that the development will generate "net public costs" and
requires that the developer compensate the county for those capital im-
provement costs that his development will generate or, where appro-
priate, construct the public facilities according to county specifications
and donate the facilities to the appropriate public agency. If a devel-
opment is non-residential, then the developer is usually responsible for
the enlargement or extension of the county road system and various
utility systems. If the development is a residential one, however, then
the developer may be required to provide park sites, open space areas,
and school facilities.3
Article 12 thus attempts to assess the developer for the impact that
his rezoning application will have on the county service facilities. The
ordinance does not expressly address the impact of developments that
do not require a rezoning.
V. THE IMPACT TAx As GENERAL REVENUE:
CALIFORNIA
A. Legal Development
Like other states, California has a state statute, the Subdivision
Map Act, 4 authorizing local governments to regulate the subdivision
32. Quoted in Ducker, Loudoun County's Pay-as-You Grow Plan, 26 LAND-UsE L.
& ZONING DIG., No. 1, 1974, at 3.
33. Id. at 4.
34. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 66,410-66,499.37 (West Cum. Supp. 1975).
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of land. Early attempts to enact modest impact taxes as a building
"fee" were uniformly invalidated by California courts.
The City of Santa Ana, for example, under the "authority" of the
Subdivision Map Act enacted an ordinance in 1956 imposing a "per
lot" business license fee of fifty dollars. The revenue was to be used
for capital improvements and fire protection. In an action challenging
this fee, a court held that a revenue-raising fee could not be imposed
as a condition for subdivision map approval:
[While] a charter city has broad powers in the imposition of taxes
for revenue purposes and . . . a license tax may be levied for
the privilege of carrying on a business, [there are limitations on
these powers] . . . . [A]n ordinance attempting to impose an-
other regulation, unrelated to design and improvement, as a pre-
requisite to the filing of a [final subdivision] map . . . conflicts
with the whole plan of the Subdivision Map Act.35
The significance "of the distinction between regulatory and rev-
enue taxes was observed by Modesto, California, which asked the State
Attorney General's opinion regarding the validity of a proposed ordi-
nance.3 6 The ordinance would provide authority to raise revenue for
the planning, acquisition, improvement, and expansion of public parks,
playgrounds, and recreation facilities. Every person constructing a
dwelling unit within the city would pay a minimum of fifteen dollars
for each unit of not more than one bedroom, plus five dollars for each
additional bedroom, with a maximum imposition of thirty dollars. Most
important, the taxes were payable when a building permit was issued.
The Attorney General opined that the Modesto "per unit constructed"
tax ordinance was valid insofar as the tax was not precedent to approval
of a final subdivision map.
Santa Clara (a charter city) next adopted both a modified sub-
division ordinance and a business license tax on the construction of new
residential units. The business license tax was similar to that approved
for Modesto by the Attorney General. The subdivision ordinance pro-
vided that as a condition precedent to issuance of any building permit
and approval of a final subdivision map, the builder or developer was
to pay a sum into a "Capital Outlay Recreational Fund" that was to be
used throughout the city.3 7 In light of the Santa Ana decision, it came
35. Newport Bldg. Corp. v. City of Santa Ana, 210 Cal. App. 2d 771, 776-77, 26
Cal. Rptr. 797, 800 (Ct. App. 1962).
36. 45 CAL. Op. AT'ry GEN. 23 (1965).
37. See Santa Clara County Contractors & Homebuilders Ass'n v. City of Santa
Clara, 232 Cal. App. 2d 564, 571-72, 43 Cal. Rptr. 86, 90-91 (Ct. App. 1965). The
amount payable was at most $25 for each dwelling or apartment unit. Id.
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as no surprise that the court held the ordinance unauthorized. Quoting
the reasoning of an earlier case, the court stated: "'The purpose and
intent of the Subdivision Map Act is to provide for the regulation and
control of the design and improvement of a subdivision with proper
consideration of its relation to adjoining areas, not to provide funds for
the benefit of an entire city.' 3 The court went on to indicate that
as a subdivision condition only fees authorized by the statute could be
imposed and further, that "the state has pre-empted the field in all re-
spects concerning subdivisions, except as to design and improvement
"39
Four of the first seven cities to adopt impact taxation for revenue
purposes were charter cities. The power of California charter cities
to levy taxes for revenue purposes is well established in California law.
The other three cities-Fairfield, Rohnert Park, and Newark-were
general law cities. Their power to tax for revenue purposes was less
certain.
Newark's ordinance became the test case.40 Since Newark did
not condition approval of a final subdivision map on payment of the
license "fee," the ordinance did not run afoul of the Santa Ana" and
Santa Clara4" decisions. Plaintiff Homebuilders Association contended
that the Newark ordinance violated guarantees of equal protection by
taxing residential construction at a substantially higher rate than the
building of commercial and industrial structures.43 The court upheld
the power of cities to make reasonable classifications for taxing pur-
poses.4 4 Impact taxes levied by a general city law were held to be au-
thorized by state law because the court treated the tax as a business
license tax; the ordinance did not seek to regulate the issuance of build-
ing permits but sought to raise revenues for the city.45
The Newark decision was also significant for what it did not say.
The case did not place limits on how business license taxes on new con-
38. Id. at 572, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 93 (quoting Kelber v. City of Upland, 155 Cal.
App. 2d 631, 638, 318 P.2d 561, 565-66 (Ct. App. 1957)) (emphasis added).
39. Id. at 580, 43 Cal. Rptr. at 96.
40. Associated Homebuilders v. City of Newark, 18 Cal. App. 3d 107, 95 Cal.
Rptr. 648 (Ct. App. 1971).
41. Newport Bldg. Corp. v. City of Santa Ana, 210 Cal. App. 2d 771, 36 Cal. Rptr.
797 (Ct. App. 1962).
42. Santa Clara County Contractors & Homebuilders Ass'n v. City of Santa Clara,
232 Cal. App. 2d 564, 43 Cal. Rptr. 86 (Ct. App. 1965).
43. 18 Cal. App. 3d at 109, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 649.
44. Id. at 110, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 649.
45. Id. at 110-11, 95 Cal. Rptr. at 649-50.
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struction had to be spent. As distinguished from subdivision exactions,
which must be spent primarily to benefit the subdivision from which
exacted, business license taxes are general revenues.
B. Present Use of Impact Taxes
When impact taxes were first enacted in California and their legal-
ity was still doubtful, local governments had an understandable ten-
dency to write conservative ordinances. Taxes were often earmarked
for use in the development from which they were collected, much like
subdivision fees. Once the courts upheld the use of impact taxes for
raising revenue, however, local governments could fund a much greater
variety of improvements and services than was possible by means of
subdivision exactions.
For example, California local governments cannot as a condition
for subdivision approval require a developer to dedicate land for a
school site or pay fees for school construction. Impact taxes are not
so limited. The city of Oakland enacted an impact tax in October,
1972, the proceeds from which are placed in a school construction
fund.
4"
California law also requires that exactions from a given subdivision
be spent primarily to benefit that subdivision. Local governments can
spend impact taxes wherever they desire. For example, the cities of
Hermosa Beach47 and Rancho Palos Verdes 48 presently use impact taxes
to acquire park sites, purchase park equipment and construct recrea-
tional facilities throughout the cities.
VI. CONCLUSION
The impact tax is a device to impose the full cost of new develop-
ment on the new development itself. Such a tax seems fair because
it is hard to say that existing communities have an obligation to sub-
sidize new development, particularly if some or all of the subsidy ends
up in the hands of the landowner who sells off the land for development
or the developer who builds.
46. OAKLAND MUNICIPAL CODE ch. 5, art. 26.
47. Interview by Jeff Redding with H.R. Mel, Hermosa Beach Planner, in Her-
mosa Beach, Cal. (March 1975).
48. Interview by Jeff Redding with J. Johnson, Rancho Palos Verdes Planner, in
Rancho Palos Verdes, Cal. (March 1975).
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Whether the impact tax is too high depends on where it is spent.
If it is spent in the area from which it is collected, and redounds to
the benefit of the land there, it can hardly ever be said to be too high
in the sense of being confiscatory or prohibitory. One pays more be-
cause one receives more.
